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Escaping the Sporhase Maze: Protecting State Waters
Within the Commerce Clause
Mark S. Davis∗
Michael Pappas∗∗
ABSTRACT
Eastern states, though they have enjoyed a history of relatively
abundant water, increasingly face the need to conserve water,
particularly to protect water-dependent ecosystems. At the same
time, growing water demands, climate change, and an emerging
water-oriented economy have intensified pressure for interstate
water transfers. Thus, even traditionally wet states are seeking to
protect or secure their water supplies. However, restrictions on
water sales and exports risk running afoul of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. This Article offers guidance for states,
particularly eastern states concerned with maintaining and
improving water-dependent ecosystems, in seeking to restrict water
exports while staying within the confines of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Water is the stuff of conflict. Essential to both life and
commerce, but too often insufficient for all to have their fill, water
makes enemies of landowners, irrigators, energy developers,
environmentalists, ecosystems, industries, individuals, companies,
flora, and fauna. So often, water places neighbors at odds.1
Such struggles over water have played a defining role in the
story of the western United States, and increasingly the wave of
conflict washes east as newfound scarcity breeds concern and
conflict. Recently, water disputes have arisen between North
Carolina and South Carolina,2 between Mississippi and Tennessee,3
as well as among Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.4 Moreover,
droughts in the southern and southeastern United States have forced
Texas to endure the driest seven-month span on record5 and have led
football stadiums in Georgia to limit fans’ freedom to flush during
major sporting events.6
1. As often quoted in water law articles, “[W]hiskey is for drinking and
water is for fighting over.” See, e.g., Mark Davis & James Wilkins, A Defining
Resource: Louisiana’s Place in the Emerging Water Economy, 57 LOY. L. REV.
273, 285 (2011).
2. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 858 (2010).
3. Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 627 (5th
Cir. 2009).
4. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1355 (M.D.
Fla. 2009).
5. See, e.g., Betsy Blaney, Texas Drought 2011: State Endures Driest 7-Month
Span on Record, HUFFPOST GREEN (May 9, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/05/10/texas-drought-2011-record_n_859902.html.
6. See Drinking Water Basics, NAT’L ACADS. WATER INFO. CTR., http://
water.nationalacademies.org/basics.shtml (last visited July 31, 2012) (“In
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As water concerns grow in the national consciousness, a new
challenge continues to place neighbors (this time states) in a
difficult position regarding competing interests in water. This
challenge is interstate water markets and their demand to export
water from states where it is relatively abundant to drier environs.
Concerned about climate change, drought, environmental
conservation and enhancement, new in-state water needs, and a
growing awareness that one state’s water may be very much
coveted by its neighbors,7 states are seeking to find ways to hold
on to their water, maintain and improve ecosystems, and turn water
into a strategic asset.
Louisiana and Texas offer a current example of this neighborly
challenge. Louisiana, positioned at the terminus of major rivers
and built by the alluvial action of those rivers, is a relatively waterrich state. In fact, water concerns in Louisiana are more frequently
perceived as stemming from overabundance (i.e., flooding) rather
than from shortage.8 However, Louisiana is increasingly
experiencing droughts and requires a copious outpouring of
freshwater to maintain, much less restore, its vanishing coastline.9
Texas, on the other hand, is not known for its abundant freshwater
and has long recognized that its water resources are not sufficient
to support its water use.10 In fact, Texas began eyeing Louisiana’s

Athens, Georgia, fans at the University of Georgia’s homecoming football game
were asked not to flush the toilets: stadium attendants were even hired to
moderate flushing in a desperate effort to save water.”).
7. Support for this statement is too extensive to document here. However, by
way of example, see Amy Joi O’Donoghue, The Fight for Water: Can the Mighty
Mississippi Save the West?, DESERET NEWS (May 13, 2012, 6:21 P.M.), http://
www.deseretnews.com/article/865555735/The-fight-for-water-Can-the-mightyMississippi-save-the-West.html?pg=all.
8. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 63 (1985) (observing that “[n]o
state in America is more familiar with flood losses than Louisiana, which sits on
the Gulf of Mexico at the receiving end of waters draining the entire Central
United States” and that “development of New Orleans and much of South
Louisiana is a study in the very defiance of water”).
9. See COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., LOUISIANA’S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST (2012), available at
http://www.lacpra.org/assets/docs/2012%20Master%20Plan/Final%20Plan/2012
%20Coastal%20Master%20Plan.pdf [hereinafter 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL
MASTER PLAN], for a detailed examination highly reliant on river flows.
10. See Joe Patranella, Note, Love Thy Neighbor as Thyself: An Analysis of
the Texas Water Shortage, Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, and
Why Oklahoma Should Be Mandated to Allow Texas to Purchase Water, 52 S.
TEX. L. REV. 297, 298 (2010) (explaining that “Texas is at an alarming
crossroads in regard to its water supply” and that “[o]ne can hardly drive down
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Mississippi River water as long ago as 1968.11 This water disparity
between neighbors came to a head during the crippling record
drought that in 2011 left Texas desperate for water.12 During that
time, a private water-marketing company based in Texas proposed
to buy up to 600,000 acre-feet of water per year from Louisiana’s
Sabine River Authority.13 The idea of sending this water out of
state found broad opposition in Louisiana, a state dependent on
abundant water for everything from navigation to coastal
restoration.14 So the question arose: What can be done to restrict
such an export?
Such a question about what a state might do to ensure that its
waters do not become merely a well for wealthy neighbors is not
unique to Louisiana. In fact, states have attempted to protect their
water supplies from export for years.15 Given the rise of the new
“water economy,”16 states’ escalating desires to take tighter hold of
their water resources is perfectly reasonable.17 Further, it seems in
keeping with our nation’s long tradition of leaving the nature and
definition of water rights to the states.18

the ever-crowded lanes of Interstate 35 without noticing a smattering of
billboards encouraging, if not begging, the citizens of the Metroplex to curtail
their water usage”).
11. See TEX. WATER DEV. BD., CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1968), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/State_Water_Plan/
1968/1968%20Plan5.pdf.
12. See SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, THE IMPACT
OF THE 2011 DROUGHT AND BEYOND (2011), available at http://www.window.
state.tx.us/specialrpt/drought/pdf/96-1704-Drought.pdf (stating that 2011 was “the
driest year Texas has seen since modern recordkeeping began in 1895”).
13. See Tom Aswell, Jindal in Need of Deniability in Toledo Bend Water
Sale Issue; À La John Kerry, He Was for the Sale Before He Was Against It, LA.
VOICE (Feb. 1, 2012), http://louisianavoice.com/2012/02/01/jindal-in-need-ofdeniability-in-toledo-bend-water-sale-issue-a-la-john-kerry-he-was-for-the-salebefore-he-was-against-it/.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Robert F. Durant & Michelle Deany Holmes, Thou Shalt Not
Covet Thy Neighbor’s Water: The Rio Grande Basin Regulatory Experience, 45
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 821, 821–22 (1985) (analyzing “New Mexico’s experience as
it sought first to deny and later to place severe limits on the export of
groundwater to the city of El Paso, Texas”).
16. See, e.g., Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1.
17. See Durant & Holmes, supra note 15, at 821 (explaining that, in light of
a burgeoning water demand across the country, as well as water-deficient states
increasingly coveting the supplies of their neighbors, “those states that are
vulnerable seek to impose or preserve statutory barriers to water export”).
18. See Stephen F. Williams, Free Trade in Water Resources: Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 2 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 89, 92 (1983) (stating that
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It was just such an inclination that led Nebraska to limit the
export of its groundwater. But when the United States Supreme
Court struck down part of that restriction on Dormant Commerce
Clause grounds in Sporhase v. Nebraska in 1982,19 a new chapter
in American water law began. Since Sporhase, questions have
lingered about the balance between state authority over water
resources and the limits of the Dormant Commerce Clause.20
Now, mounting pressure for water exports has increasingly
placed the issue on state water-planning agendas and before the
courts.21 However, much has changed in America’s water-scape
since Sporhase, and water stewardship has become an urgent issue
not only in dry western states, but also in traditionally wet eastern
states. The prospects of rising seas and climate change are
increasing the importance of states’ abilities to protect the water
supplies necessary to secure their futures.22 Moreover, rolled into
these concerns are the challenges presented by water-based
ecosystems in the traditionally wetter eastern states. With efforts
not only to conserve and maintain but also to enhance and
replenish water-dependent wetlands, estuaries, and coastlines, a
state’s ability to control its water resources becomes all the more
important.23

exemptions for resources subject to fictional state ownership arose in 1896 and,
soon afterward, the Court applied the doctrine to water).
19. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
20. See generally Williams, supra note 18, at 93–94 (contending that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sporhase failed to define a judicial test for
scrutinizing water-export barriers and introduced ambiguous terms to guide the
court’s future analyses).
21. The Supreme Court may even be in a position to reconsider the issue.
See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011),
petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3453 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2012).
22. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The
Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV.
781, 785–86 (2010) (discussing climate change impacts on water resources); A.
Dan Tarlock, How California Local Governments Became Both Water Suppliers
and Planners, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 10 (2010) (“A cascade of
climate change studies continue to predict that arid and semiarid areas such as
the American West face the risk of permanently decreased water budgets as
precipitation declines and temperatures increase.”).
23. See, e.g., Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 273 (explaining that water
in Louisiana “will be a scarce resource that will demand a well-thought-out and
integrated approach to its stewardship” balancing “navigation, flood control,
environmental, agricultural, industrial, and drinking water supplies,” and, “[a]s
if things are not complicated enough, regional and interstate water needs are also
growing, as are energy-driven water uses”).
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Neither case law nor scholarly analysis has addressed the
impact of Sporhase in eastern states or its particular impact on
environmental conservation and restoration served by keeping
water in place. Further, the cases that have followed Sporhase
fundamentally misapply it, distorting the state–federal balance.24 In
response, this Article offers guidance for states, particularly eastern
states concerned with maintaining and improving water-dependent
ecosystems, in seeking to restrict water exports while staying
within the confines of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Accordingly, in Part II, we begin by documenting some of the
environmental concerns that may particularly impact the wetter
eastern states and animate state efforts to limit the export of water.
Then, in Part III, we revisit Sporhase and the line of cases leading
up to it to provide a proper background and understanding of the
balance between states’ powers to regulate water and the Dormant
Commerce Clause’s limitations. Following that, in Part IV, we
highlight the important considerations that Sporhase and its
surrounding cases leave for states to contemplate in shaping their
water restrictions, and drawing on the example of Louisiana, we
offer guidance for how eastern states might navigate the Sporhase
Doctrine to protect environmental water uses.
II. WET STATES AND WATER NEEDS
The logic is so simple as to be obvious: water-based
environments require water to survive. Thus, unsurprisingly,
“[w]hen rivers and streams are deprived of adequate supplies of
flowing water, the effects on wildlife are often devastating.”25 In
fact, the effects are devastating on the entire ecosystem, as entire
coastal estuaries, which are vital breeding grounds for plant and
animal species, suffer with insufficient freshwater flows.26 There is
no substitute for water flowing in its natural place.
The western United States offers numerous examples of the
struggles to maintain water supplies for ecosystems and the
environmental harms resulting from inadequate water. Sufficient
water flowing instream is essential for the trout and salmon
populations of the Northwest, which would suffer greatly without
state efforts to ensure these water supplies.27 Similarly, in the
24. See infra notes 127–156 and accompanying text.
25. Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private
Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203, 203 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Why Restore Estuaries?, RESTORE AMERICA’S ESTUARIES,
http://www.estuaries.org/why-restore-estuaries/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
27. Sterne, supra note 25, at 204.
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Southwest, the riparian and wetland habitats, home to myriad plant
and animal species that once flourished in the Colorado River
Delta, were dependent on sufficient water flowing from the
Colorado River into the Sea of Cortez.28 Without the water flows,
those habitats and species are dwindling, if not gone altogether.29
Obviously, eastern ecosystems require water as well, but
because the wetter eastern states have historically not faced the
water-supply challenges of the West, there has been less difficulty
in maintaining sufficient water to sustain the environment.
However, this does not diminish the need for water in place to
maintain these environments. Abundant flowing freshwater
supplies are crucial to ecosystems throughout the eastern United
States, including the Everglades30 and the Chesapeake Bay.31 In
fact, because these eastern ecosystems have evolved around a
greater abundance of water, they frequently require a greater
quantity of water than do those in the West. For example,
enormous flows of sediment-laden freshwater32 are essential to the
continued existence and productivity33 of Louisiana’s coast, which
has experienced a crisis of land loss since at least the 1930s.34 This
environment requires abundant freshwater just to maintain the
current, depleted coastline.
Moreover, these freshwater supplies are necessary for mere
maintenance of the status quo, but environmental restoration and
28. See Sean T. Olson, Saving a Dying Oasis: Utilizing the United Nations
Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses to
Preserve and Restore the Colorado River Delta, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
159, 159–60 (2005).
29. Id.
30. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Learn About Your Watershed: Everglades
Watershed, FLORIDA’S WATER, http://www.protectingourwater.org/watersheds/
map/everglades/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
31. “Within the Chesapeake Bay watershed, five major rivers—the
Susquehanna, Potomac, Rappahannock, York and James—provide almost 90
percent of the fresh water to the Bay.” Rivers and Streams, CHESAPEAKE BAY
PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/issue/rivers_and_streams (last
visited Aug. 1, 2012).
32. LA. GROUND WATER RES. COMM’N, MANAGING LOUISIANA’S
GROUNDWATER RESOURCES 9 (2012), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/
docs/conservation/groundwater/12.Final.GW.Report.pdf (“A reliable supply of
fresh water is critically important to the long-term success of the [Louisiana
Master Plan for Coastal Restoration and Protection].”).
33. See 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 9, at 20
(noting that a healthy Louisiana coast provides, among other benefits, 26% of
continental U.S. commercial fisheries production and habitat for 5 million
migratory waterfowl).
34. Id. at 14; Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes,
Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3, 9–10 (1983).
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enhancement will require even greater freshwater supplies. For
example, restoration efforts in Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master
Plan are premised on increased freshwater uses.35 Across the coast
of Louisiana, the plan’s restoration agendas call for projects that
“[m]aintain and increase, where possible, the input of freshwater to
maintain a balance among saline and fresh wetlands,” “increas[e]
the use of Atchafalaya River sediment and water . . . to sustain the
coastal ecosystem,” and “[u]se sediment and water from the
Mississippi River to sustain and rebuild land.”36 Additionally, the
plan further focuses on freshwater, calling for “restor[ing] natural
hydrologic patterns by conveying fresh water to areas that have
been cut off by man-made features or by preventing the intrusion
of salt water into fresh areas through man-made channels and
eroded wetlands,” as well as diverting sediment using freshwater.37
These plans are built on assumptions about environmental
scenarios that include river discharge of between 509,000 and
534,000 cubic feet per second.38 As this makes clear, Louisiana’s
coast needs a lot of freshwater, sometimes in large doses, to
maintain itself, much less rebuild.
Beyond Louisiana, there is a national demand for freshwater to
support restoration, enhancement, and even creation of wetland
ecosystems. In fact, as a condition for any Clean Water Act
Section 404(b) permit for dredging or filling a wetland, the EPA
and Army Corps require compensatory mitigation for losses of
aquatic resources, which includes “restoration, enhancement,
establishment, and in certain circumstances preservation” of
aquatic resource functions.39 Such projects, which may involve
greater than one-to-one acreage compensation,40 will likely require
freshwater supplies greater than those currently allocated to
environmental uses, and water in place will be essential to meeting
these demands.
Sufficient freshwater flow is essential for maintaining aquatic
environments, and having a reliable water source in place is
necessary for improving and restoring them. To ensure that such
water is available and in place, “wet” states, which are likely to be
35. See 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 9, at 46.
36. Id. at 31, 118, 124, 130.
37. Id. at 68–69.
38. Id. at 83. To give these flow numbers some context, the average annual
flow of the Colorado River measured at Lees Ferry is 15 million acre-feet per
year or 20,719 cubic feet per second. See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, INTERIM REPORT NO. 1: COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY (STATUS REPORT) 18 (2011).
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.93 (2011).
40. See id.
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targeted as sources for interstate water markets, may wish to limit
water exports.
III. A HISTORY OF STATE WATER REGULATION AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
While state police power provides a basis for regulating the use
and export of water, the Dormant Commerce Clause limits state
power in this area. Thus, to successfully protect water in place,
states must navigate the Sporhase Doctrine to create water
restrictions that do not run afoul of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. This Part offers the background context for understanding
the Sporhase Doctrine. First, it gives a broad overview of state
water regulations. Next, it turns to an outline of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in general. Finally, it considers the line of cases
where these two intersect, culminating in the leading case on the
issue, Sporhase.
A. State Water Regulation
Water has historically been a natural resource controlled by the
states as part of their police power, and the regulation, allocation,
and administration of water resources has, with little exception,
been an aspect of state law.41 Thus, there are 50 different sets of
water laws in the United States.42 Each state has developed its own
water-law regimes for surface water and groundwater (which are
often treated separately),43 and states’ treatment of water ranges
from a fully-held private property interest to a mere usufruct right.
Though each state employs its own distinct water provisions,
multiple states certainly embrace common doctrines.44 While most
41. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 315 (3d ed. 1997)
(“The federal government has long deferred to state law in the allocation of
water, even on public lands.”).
42. See, e.g., R. Timothy Weston, Harmonizing Management of Ground
and Surface Water Use Under Eastern Water Law Regimes, 11 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 239, 246 (2008) (discussing the eastern states’ embrace of the
riparian rights doctrine but remarking that “[t]he details of riparian doctrine vary
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; while the jurisdictions share many
fundamental principles, subtle but important nuances exist within the laws of the
eastern states” (citation omitted)).
43. For further discussion of the law of groundwater and diffused surface
water, see GETCHES, supra note 41, at 8–11.
44. For example, “[t]he eight most arid states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) constitutionally or
statutorily repudiated riparian rights very early and adopted prior appropriation
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states have replaced the pure common law doctrines with
“statutory,” “regulated,” or “permit-based” variations,45 the
traditional structures described below remain descriptive enough to
offer a broad overview.
In the case of surface water, western states generally favor the
prior appropriation doctrine; whereas, eastern states generally take
a riparian approach.46 The prior appropriation states of the West
traditionally recognize water rights only when water is diverted
from its natural course and put to beneficial use, so severing water
from its watercourse is essential to the right.47 The other key
attribute of prior-appropriation schemes is the “first-in-time, firstin-right” approach to shortage, whereby an earlier (“senior”) water
user has right to his entire appropriation before a more recent
(“junior”) appropriator has any right to water.48
Eastern riparian regimes, on the other hand, focus on
maintaining water in watercourses and sharing in times of
shortage. Riparian water rights stem not from diversion, but rather
from ownership of a tract of land that abuts or contains a

as the sole method of acquiring rights to the use of water for all beneficial
purposes.” Id. at 81.
45. See, e.g., id. at 5 (observing that “[r]iparian rules have been altered by
statute and case law so that today there are no riparian doctrine states governed
simply by common law” and that, “[t]ypically, riparians must obtain permits
from a state agency in order to use water”).
46. See id. at 21–22 (explaining that as the United States expanded, the
preexisting “riparian doctrine was thought to be impractical for the arid region
beyond the one-hundredth meridian” because it was “[a] system that limited
rights to owners of land bordering a stream,” leading to the West’s embrace of
the prior appropriation doctrine to allow settlers to “make a diversion that did
not deprive ‘prior appropriators’ of the quantity of water already being diverted
by them”).
47. Id. While some jurisdictions require the physical diversion of water
from a stream, others do not require actual removal of the water as long as there
is some use of it, including instream use. Id. at 92–93. See also, e.g., Bountiful
City v. De Luca, 292 P. 194 (Utah 1930) (requiring a diversion of water even for
use as a water supply for livestock). But see In re Dearborn Drainage Area, 766
P.2d 228, 233 (Mont. 1988) (“A completed appropriation meant an actual
diversion of the water which served any of several purposes. Diversion proved
an intent to appropriate the water, as did the capacity of the works.” (citations
omitted)), overruled by In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of
All of the Water, 55 P.3d 396 (Mont. 2002) (holding that a diversion is not
required when water can be used beneficially without a diversion).
48. Id. at 101 (“When there is not enough water for both senior and junior
appropriators, the doctrine of priority allows the full senior right to be exercised
before the junior can use any water.”).
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watercourse (i.e., a riparian tract).49 A riparian landowner
traditionally has the right to make reasonable use of water on the
riparian tract or within a prescribed distance from the watercourse
so that return flows will ensure sufficient water for downstream
users.50 In times of drought, all riparians share the burden of
shortage; earlier users receive no favored status.51
States also vary in their legal treatment of groundwater, which
is usually managed and regulated differently than surface water
despite being chemically fungible (as well as, in some cases,
hydrologically connected). This disparity is undoubtedly rooted in
the physical obviousness of surface water and the hidden nature of
groundwater aquifers that, until the 1930s, were beyond our
technical capacity to tap to any great degree.52 Over the past
hundred years, great advances have been made in our
understanding of hydrology and our ability to access, transport,
and treat water to make it usable, but for the most part the laws
governing groundwater continue to treat it as a resource legally
distinct from surface water. Groundwater management schemes
fall into five predominant regimes that are often statutorily
modified within states.53 However, unlike surface-water laws, state
groundwater doctrines do not fall into as predictable of a pattern in
the eastern as in the western United States; in fact, individual states
may contain multiple groundwater management districts with
differing regulations.54
States also vary in the legal status they give to water rights. In
some states, water rights are merely usufruct interests; in other
states they are closer to private property. For example, in
Louisiana, running waters and naturally navigable waters are
“public things” owned by the State in its capacity as a public

49. Id. at 59 (“Because parties generally intend to transfer water rights
along with the land, the courts have held that a conveyance of riparian land
carries with it all of the riparian rights appurtenant to that land even if not
expressly conveyed by the deed.”).
50. Id. at 48–49 (“A riparian proprietor is subject to liability for making an
unreasonable use of the water of a watercourse or lake that causes harm to
another riparian proprietor’s reasonable use of the water or his land.”).
51. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 475 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827)
(explaining that all riparian proprietors have equal right to use the balance of
water flowing in a shared waterway).
52. See, e.g., Michael Pappas, Unnatural Resource Law: Situating
Desalination in Coastal Resource and Water Law Doctrines, 86 TUL. L. REV.
81, 97 (2011).
53. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 345
(3d ed. 2000).
54. Id.
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person;55 all water rights are merely usufruct.56 A number of other
state laws also contain declarations that surface water is publicly
owned and that water rights permit only certain uses.57 On the
other hand, in some jurisdictions “a water right is a legally
recognized and freely alienable property right.”58
These differences in the property status of water rights can
exist not only between states, but also within the same state. For
example, some states, like Texas and Louisiana, recognize greater
private property rights in groundwater than in surface water.59
Again, this stems from groundwater’s long treatment as something
completely apart from surface water and so difficult to understand
as to put it beyond public control and oversight.60
All of this variation underscores that treatment, characterization,
and management of water resources are functions of state law.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Far from being a creature of state law, the Dormant Commerce
Clause is thoroughly federal in nature. It grows out of the
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution, which gives
the federal government the power to regulate interstate
55. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1107 (2011). The high seas are a common
thing under article 449 and are not owned, in the property sense, by anyone. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2010).
56. See GETCHES, supra note 41, at 213 (explaining that Louisiana has
various statutorily created types of water districts that supply customers with
use, but not ownership, of water).
57. See id. at 304 (noting that “a few states attempt to regulate or restrict a
landowner’s use of diffused surface water”).
58. See Robert E. Beck & Owen L. Anderson, Reallocations, Transfers, and
Changes, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 14.01(b)(1) (Robert E. Beck &
Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2012).
59. See, e.g., Texas Water Law, TEX. A&M UNIV., http://texaswater.
tamu.edu/water-law (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (discussing the difference in
Texas surface versus groundwater law).
60. This view is at the heart of the “rule of capture” approach to
groundwater use and management, which is the law in Texas and is effectively
the law in Louisiana. In justifying this “it’s yours if you take it” approach, the
Texas Supreme Court has noted that groundwater is “so secret, occult, and
concealed that an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to [it]
would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would, therefore, be practically
impossible.” See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex.
1999) (citation omitted). Most states have gravitated away from this capture
rule, but recently Texas not only affirmed the rule, but went further to hold that
restrictions on future withdrawals by owners of overlying parcels may give rise
to compensable takings claims against the state. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v.
Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 838 (Tex. 2012).
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commerce.61 The “flip side” of this grant of power to the federal
government is the Dormant (or Negative) Commerce Clause, a
doctrine built on the reasoning that if the federal government has
the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, then states
necessarily cannot legislate to interfere with interstate commerce.62
The fundamental inquiry in Dormant Commerce Clause cases,
then, is whether states are interfering with interstate commerce,
and the challenge courts face is distinguishing between
impermissible interference and economic protectionism, on the one
hand, and permissible exercise of state police power to regulate
health and safety, on the other.63
In making these determinations in the water context, the court
first distinguishes between “evenhanded” regulations and “explicit
barriers to commerce.”64 If a restriction “regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental,” the court will apply the
balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church and will uphold the
restriction “unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”65
However, if a regulation facially or intentionally discriminates
against commerce, it is an “explicit barrier to commerce” subject
to strict scrutiny; for such a measure to survive, the state must
demonstrate that it is narrowly tailored to a legitimate local
purpose.66
C. Striking the Balance: Sporhase in Context
Since the founding of the Union, state water regulations and
the Dormant Commerce Clause have found themselves at odds in
only a handful of cases.67 Though countless legal disputes have
arisen over water as a highway for commerce (leading to tomes of
jurisprudence and commentary relating to navigation and

61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
62. See Christine A. Klein, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water
Export: Toward a New Analytical Program, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 134
(2011).
63. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
64. See id. at 954–58.
65. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
66. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
67. See, e.g., WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 58 (2d ed. 1988) (“Until 1982,
the U.S. Supreme Court had not considered the constitutionality of antiexportation
statutes in light of the so-called ‘negative Commerce Clause’ . . . .”).
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navigability),68 rarely has interstate controversy arisen over water
as an article of commerce itself.69 That, however, is changing
rapidly. As noted above, with increasing water demands,
overexploited water resources, and climate change destabilizing
water supplies, interstate water markets are on the rise.70 These
markets increase demand and pressure for the export of water from
one state to another, building the tension between state powers to
regulate waters and federal limits on these powers. As these
concerns amplify and creep east, as “dry” states eye their “wet”
neighbors, and as the options for preserving and restoring waterbased ecosystems decrease, this area of law needs to come into
much sharper focus. This process begins with properly
understanding the handful of cases on the subject: the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Hudson County, Altus, and Sporhase, and the
subsequent lower court cases El Paso I, El Paso II, and Tarrant.
In 1908, the Supreme Court first addressed the balance
between state water restrictions and the Dormant Commerce
Clause in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,71 holding that
New Jersey’s characterization of water as a state-owned resource
insulated its water-use restrictions from Dormant Commerce
Clause review.72 As a result, the Court concluded that New
Jersey’s “ownership” of its water resources was sufficient to justify
its prohibition on interstate transfer of surface water.73
The New Jersey statute at issue in Hudson County sought to
conserve freshwater “for the health and prosperity of [its] citizens”
by making it illegal for any person or corporation to transport New
Jersey surface water for use in any other state.74 A water company,
which, despite that statute, had contracted to provide water from a
68. See id. at 73–74 (explaining that the Supreme Court of the United States
decided in 1865 that commerce includes transportation, “which in turn includes
‘navigation,’ and that the power to regulate navigation includes the control of
navigable waters,” and the Court provided for a broad interpretation of the
navigation power).
69. There certainly have been numerous disputes between states over claims
to certain water sources, such as the Colorado River or the Great Lakes, but
these disputes have focused on the right to withdraw or the allocation of water
rather than water as an article of commerce. See generally Robert W. Adler,
Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a Change?, 28 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19 (2008).
70. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
71. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
72. Id. at 356–57.
73. Id. at 354.
74. Id. at 353 (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to
transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the waters of any
fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river, or stream of this state into any other
state, for use therein.”).
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New Jersey River for use in New York City, then challenged the
statute, asserting that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.75
In evaluating the challenge, the Court emphasized that New
Jersey, as part of its police power, had the power to define property
rights and, consequently, had the power to reserve certain
resources in the public rather than private or commercial spheres.76
The Court explained that “the state, as quasi-sovereign and
representative of the interests of the public” has the power to
protect its natural resources and define the limits of property
interests that may be held in those resources.77 Moreover, the Court
particularly stressed the extent of state power to define the property
interests available in water resources, noting:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and
independent of particular theory than the interest of the
public of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly
within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts
upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit
for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.78
The Court further reasoned that New Jersey had exercised its
police power authority to keep its water resources outside of
commerce and to maintain a “residuum of public ownership” in all
waters.79 So, while New Jersey law permitted riparian usage of
water, allowing riparian proprietors to divert limited amounts of
water within prescribed distances and for certain ordinary uses,80
75. The water company brought a host of other claims as well. Id. at 353–54
(“The defendant sets up that the statute, if applicable to it, is contrary to the
Constitution of the United States, that it impairs the obligation of contracts,
takes property without due process of law, interferes with commerce between
New Jersey and New York, denies the privileges of citizens of New Jersey to
citizens of other States, and denies to them the equal protection of the laws.”).
76. See id. at 355 (“The limits set to property by other public interests
present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power of the State.”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 355–56.
79. Id. at 354–55. The statute and controversy at issue in this case dealt only
with surface water, and the Court specifically addressed “rivers” in much of its
reasoning. However, periodically, the Court shifted its language from “surface
water” or “rivers” to “water.” See id. at 355 (“[T]he state, as quasi-sovereign and
representative of the interests of the public, has a standing in court to protect the
atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its territory . . . .”). This does not
change the narrow subject of the case from just surface water, and the failure to
differentiate may be because the opinion predated the boom of groundwater
usage beginning in the 1930s.
80. Id. (“The private right to appropriate is subject . . . to the initial
limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of
public welfare and health.”).
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these riparian rights did not include grants of title in the corpus of
the water.81 The Court stressed that New Jersey riparian proprietors
did not own the body of the stream, which remained property of
the state; rather the riparian merely had the right “to have the flow
continue.”82 In reaching its conclusion, the Court focused its
inquiry on the extent of state police power and the announced New
Jersey law; it did not make a practical inquiry into how New Jersey
water was treated de facto (i.e., whether water was actually
transferred commercially or for payment in New Jersey). In sum,
the Court held that water in New Jersey was publicly owned and
managed by the state, and while riparians had some right to use the
water, the water itself was not, and under New Jersey law could
not be,83 privately owned or commoditized.84
Hudson County stood as the sole Supreme Court precedent
regarding Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to a water
restriction until 1966,85 when the Court summarily affirmed that a
Texas water regulation violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.86
This case, City of Altus v. Carr, involved a suit by an Oklahoma
city challenging, as a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
a Texas law forbidding the interstate export of groundwater
without approval by the Texas legislature.87 The suit proceeded
before a three-judge district court panel,88 which struck down the
statute.89 In reaching this conclusion, the district court held that
groundwater was an article of commerce under Texas law, which
allowed for private ownership and sale of groundwater once it was
pumped from the ground.90 The district court based this ruling on a
specific examination of Texas water law, ultimately concluding
that “[t]here is no question of state ownership of captured
81. Id. at 354–55 (“[A]s against the rights of riparian owners merely as
such, the state was warranted in prohibiting the acquisition of the title to water
on a larger scale.”).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 357 (“A man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use
it in commerce among the states. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited
and qualified right to the same end.”).
84. Id. at 354–56.
85. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 947 (1982).
86. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 385
U.S. 35 (1966).
87. Id. at 830.
88. This was pursuant to the now-repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2281, which provided
that “an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of a State statute on grounds of unconstitutionality should
not be granted unless the application has been heard and determined by a threejudge district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976).
89. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 830–31.
90. Id. at 839.
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underground water, for the law of Texas91 is well settled that the
landowner has the right to drill wells and appropriate the water
beneath his land.”92 Accordingly, the court held that the statute,
which restricted only interstate export and not in-state transfer of
Texas groundwater, was an undue burden on interstate
commerce.93
Texas appealed the ruling directly to the Supreme Court,94
which summarily affirmed the result without necessarily
embracing the reasoning of the court below and without supplying
its own discussion or reasoning.95 Thus, after Altus, which turned
on the intricacies of Texas’s particular groundwater regime,96
Hudson County remained the Court’s sole written opinion on the
intersection of state water regulation and the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
It was against this background that in 1982 the Court
considered Sporhase and invalidated part of a Nebraska water
statute for inconsistency with the Dormant Commerce Clause.97
The statute at issue required a permit for the withdrawal of
Nebraska groundwater that was to be transported for use in another
state.98 To qualify for such a permit, the withdrawal had to meet
four conditions.99 The first three conditions required that the
withdrawal must be reasonable, not contrary to the conservation
and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare.100 Finally, the fourth condition was a reciprocity
requirement, demanding that “the state in which the water is to be
used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground
water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska.”101 A water
91. The Texas law on this matter is unique; Texas is the only state that has
the absolute capture doctrine for groundwater. See Deborah Clarke Trejo,
Identifying and Valuing Groundwater Withdrawal Rights in the Context of
Takings Claims—A Texas Case Study, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 409, 413 (2010)
(“Indeed, Texas is the only state in the country that has not fully abandoned the
Rule of Capture.”). As previously noted, the Texas Supreme Court went even
further in 2012, holding that the owner of an overlying tract had a compensable
property interest in unpumped and uncaptured groundwater. See supra note 60.
92. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 833.
93. Id. at 839.
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006) (allowing for direct appeal to the Supreme
Court from a district court of three judges).
95. Carr v. City of Altus, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
96. Texas groundwater law is an abnormality in the United States because it
follows a strict rule of capture. See supra note 91.
97. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
98. Id. at 941, 943–44.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 944.
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user wishing to export Nebraska groundwater to Colorado
challenged the statute as a violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.102
In evaluating the case, the Court considered three issues: (1)
whether the water was an article of commerce subject to the
Dormant Commerce Clause; (2) whether Nebraska’s restrictions
imposed an impermissible burden on commerce; and (3) whether
Congress had granted to the states permission to regulate
commerce in this area.103 First, as a threshold matter, the Court
held that Nebraska’s groundwater was an article of commerce and,
thus, subject to Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry.104 Second, it
held that Nebraska’s first three restrictions were constitutionally
valid but that the fourth condition, the reciprocity requirement, was
an impermissible burden on commerce.105 Finally, the Court
determined that Congress had not granted the states authority to
regulate commerce in this area.106
The Court first concluded that Nebraska’s groundwater was an
article of commerce,107 which meant that it was subject to both
federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction and Dormant Commerce
Clause limitations.108 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
rejected Nebraska’s contention that, like the surface water at issue
in Hudson County, its groundwater was state-owned and therefore
outside of commerce.109 Rather, the Court characterized
Nebraska’s state ownership argument as “a legal fiction” because
utilities in Nebraska withdrew and distributed groundwater for
municipal water supplies.110 Because the utilities charged a fee for
providing this water, the Court concluded that groundwater was in
fact commoditized in Nebraska.111 Dismissing Nebraska’s
102. Id.
103. Id. at 941, 943–44.
104. Id. at 953–54.
105. Id. at 955, 958.
106. Id. at 941, 943–44.
107. The opinion addressed only Nebraska groundwater and offered no
comment on surface water. Id. at 953–54 (“But appellee’s claim that Nebraska
ground water is not an article of commerce goes too far: it would not only
exempt Nebraska ground water regulation from burden-on-commerce analysis,
it would also curtail the affirmative power of Congress to implement its own
policies concerning such regulation. If Congress chooses to legislate in this area
under its commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska
than in Texas and States with similar property laws.” (emphasis added) (citing
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621–23 (1978))).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 950.
110. Id. at 952.
111. Id.
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argument that these fees were paid merely for distribution and not
for the water itself, the Court concluded that the characterization of
the payment was unimportant; rather, the fact that the water was
distributed in exchange for value made it an article of commerce
regardless of the formalities of the rate structure.112 Thus, the Court
grounded its conclusion in a functionalist assessment of how
Nebraska treated water de facto, holding that Nebraska
groundwater was an article of commerce despite the Nebraska
Supreme Court’s ruling that “under Nebraska law, ground water is
not ‘a market item freely transferable for value among private
parties, and therefore [is] not an article of commerce.’”113 The
Court also stressed hydrological factors that made the water at
issue in Sporhase an article of interstate commerce, particularly
emphasizing the interstate nature of the Ogallala Aquifer, which
was the source of the water at issue.114
Having held Nebraska’s groundwater to be an article of
commerce, the Court next analyzed whether Nebraska’s
regulations ran afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Court
held that although the first three conditions were valid, the fourth
was an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.115 In this
analysis, the Court first considered whether Nebraska’s permit
conditions were evenhanded regulations or explicit barriers to
commerce, determining that the first three requirements—that the
withdrawal must be reasonable, not contrary to the conservation
and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare—were evenhanded restrictions because Nebraska
also imposed restrictions on intrastate water transfers. Thus, these
conditions received and survived the Pike balancing test.116
However, the Court found the fourth restriction—the reciprocity
requirement—to be an explicit barrier to commerce and therefore
subject to strict scrutiny review, which it ultimately failed because
it was not narrowly tailored.117 Finally, the Court considered

112. Id.
113. Id. at 944.
114. Id. at 953.
115. Id. at 954–58.
116. Id. at 954–55. In Pike, the Court stated that “[w]here the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
(citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)).
117. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
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whether Congress had permitted the states to regulate commerce in
this area and determined that it had not.118
As the first Supreme Court case to offer a written opinion
invalidating a state water restriction on Dormant Commerce Clause
grounds, Sporhase created a great amount of uncertainty.119
Particularly, Sporhase led to questions about the continued validity
of Hudson County,120 the validity of other states’ water restrictions,
and even states’ power to continue regulating their water
sources.121 The opinion led to a wave of questions and
commentary;122 however, few cases have since arisen to flesh out
the Sporhase Doctrine. In fact, the only cases directly applying
Sporhase followed within a few years of that decision and were
confined to a district court in New Mexico.
The first of these cases, El Paso v. Reynolds (“El Paso I”),
considered New Mexico’s prohibition on the out-of-state export of
groundwater and ultimately held the provision unconstitutional.123
Giving rise to the case, the City of El Paso, Texas, attempted to
meet growing water demands by appropriating groundwater from
New Mexico.124 However, a New Mexico statute banned the
export of groundwater from New Mexico for use in another
state,125 and on these grounds New Mexico denied El Paso an
118. Id. at 958–60.
119. See Arthur H. Chan, Policy Impacts of Sporhase v. Nebraska, 22 J.
ECON. ISSUES 1153, 1153 (1988) (explaining that Sporhase marked the first time
that the Court set forth a national policy governing interstate groundwater
allocation when previously states largely regulated groundwater resources and
claiming that the implications of the decision continued to require careful study).
120. See, e.g., Edward B. Schwartz, Water as an Article of Commerce: State
Embargoes Spring a Leak Under Sporhase v. Nebraska, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 103, 117 (1985) (claiming that “[i]n Sporhase, the Court completed the
reversal of Hudson County which it had begun in City of Altus”).
121. See generally Chan, supra note 119.
122. See Douglas L. Grant & Bret C. Birdsong, State Regulation of Interstate
Water Export, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 48.03 (Robert E. Beck &
Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2012).
123. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 380, 392 (D.N.M. 1983)
[hereinafter El Paso I].
124. Id. at 381.
125. Id. at 381 n.2 (“No person shall withdraw water from any underground
source in New Mexico for use in any other state by drilling a well in New
Mexico and transporting the water outside the state or by drilling a well outside
the boundaries of New Mexico and pumping water from under lands lying
within the boundaries of New Mexico; provided that nothing in this act prohibits
the transportation of water by tank truck from an underground source in New
Mexico to any other state where the water is used for exploration and drilling for
oil or gas . . . . The amount of water withdrawn from any one well for such
exportation shall never exceed three acre-feet.”).
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appropriation permit.126 El Paso then challenged the New Mexico
statute as a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.127 In
evaluating the claim, the district court applied a broad reading of
Sporhase to conclude that the water was categorically an article of
commerce.128 Rather than inquire into the specifics of New
Mexico’s water law, the district court read Sporhase as an
expansive declaration that all water is an article of commerce and
that all state ownership claims are legal fictions, regardless of the
particularities of state law or practice.129 The district court then
held New Mexico’s restrictions completely banning export to be
explicit barriers to commerce subject to strict scrutiny.130 Again
reading Sporhase broadly, the district court reasoned that “a state
may discriminate in favor of its citizens only to the extent that
water is essential to human survival. Outside of fulfilling human
survival needs, water is an economic resource.”131 Thus, the
district court found that the regulations were economic
protectionism because “there is no present or imminent shortage of
water in New Mexico for health and safety needs.”132 The court
dismissed as irrelevant New Mexico’s predictions of future
shortages for “‘public welfare’ needs, including water
requirements for municipalities, industry, irrigated agriculture,
energy production, fish and wildlife, and recreation.”133
However, this decision did not end the water struggle between
El Paso and New Mexico. In the wake of El Paso I, the New
Mexico Legislature amended the restrictions at issue, but the state
appealed the El Paso I decision to the Tenth Circuit.134 In light of
the change of law, the Tenth Circuit vacated El Paso I and
remanded the matter for the district court to reconsider El Paso’s
renewed challenge to the amended restrictions.135 Thus, in El Paso
II, the same district court considered a new set of water
126. Id. at 381.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 388.
129. Id. (stating that “water is an article of commerce” and “a state’s asserted
ownership of public waters within the state is only a legal fiction” (internal
citations omitted)). The district court reached this conclusion without examining
New Mexico’s characterization of water, despite later in the opinion recognizing
New Mexico as a “pioneer in ground water management” and as a state in
which, by law, all groundwaters “are public waters.” Id. at 389.
130. Id. at 388.
131. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 390.
133. Id.
134. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D.N.M. 1984)
[hereinafter El Paso II].
135. Id. at 696–97.

196

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

restrictions, finding some valid and others unconstitutional in light
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.136
The new statutory scheme at issue in El Paso II imposed
restrictions on some appropriations for in-state groundwater use, as
well as appropriations for out-of-state groundwater use. Permit
conditions for in-state groundwater use applied only to new
appropriations from certain “declared” basins137 and required a
finding that appropriation was “not contrary to conservation of
water within the state” and “not detrimental to the public welfare
of the state.”138 Permit conditions for out-of-state groundwater use
applied more broadly, affecting “all interstate uses of ground
water—new appropriations from declared and undeclared basins,
new surface water appropriations, transfers of water rights, and
supplemental and domestic wells.”139 These conditions required
that out-of-state uses “would not impair existing water rights, [are]
not contrary to the conservation of water within the state and [are]
not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of the citizens of
New Mexico.”140 Further, the New Mexico law also required the
state engineer to consider six additional factors in applications for
water export.141 Finally, New Mexico regulations imposed a twoyear moratorium on new groundwater wells in the two basins that
El Paso had targeted for appropriation.142
In considering El Paso’s renewed challenge, the court upheld
New Mexico’s more evenhanded restrictions. It ruled that
requiring that exports not be “contrary to the conservation of water
within the state” and “not otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare of the citizens of New Mexico” could withstand a facial
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.143 Similarly, the court held
that requiring the state engineer to consider the six factors did not
violate the Commerce Clause when applied to “new appropriations
of water to be used outside New Mexico.”144 Key to this holding
was the court’s conclusion that these export restrictions were
evenhanded because they mirrored the burdens on new
136. Id. at 708.
137. Id. at 703.
138. Id. at 697.
139. Id. at 703.
140. Id. at 697.
141. These included analyses of “the effect of the proposed export on in-state
shortages,” “the applicant’s water supply and demand,” and “the alternate
sources of water supply available to the applicant in the state of import.” Id.
142. Id. at 705–06.
143. Id. at 708. Other aspects of New Mexico’s approach to regulating water
were, however, found to violate the Commerce Clause. Id. Those aspects are
beyond the scope of this Article.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
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appropriations for in-state water use.145 However, the court also
struck down two portions of New Mexico’s amended water
restrictions as undue burdens on commerce. First, the court held
that restrictions applying only to export applications and not to instate transfers were facially discriminatory and not narrowly
tailored.146 Second, the court invalidated New Mexico’s limited
moratorium on new appropriations, finding that though it applied
evenhandedly to both in-state and out-of-state appropriators, it
served the discriminatory purpose of blocking El Paso’s attempts
to access groundwater.147 Finally, the El Paso II court retreated
from its previous hardline that only “human survival” could justify
in-state water preference; rather, the court reasoned that “health
and safety, recreational, aesthetic, environmental and economic
interests” could be sufficient “public welfare” concerns to justify
some in-state preference.148
After El Paso I and II, no case directly confronted the Sporhase
issue of whether water restrictions run afoul of the Dormant
Commerce Clause until Tarrant Regional Water District v.
Herrmann.149 The Tarrant case involved a Dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to Oklahoma’s laws restricting water exports,
with the additional wrinkle that some of those waters were covered
by the multistate Red River Compact.150 The case arose when the
Tarrant Regional Water District, a Texas state agency, sought to
appropriate water in Oklahoma for use in Texas.151 In conjunction
with its application for an appropriation permit, Tarrant sought
declaratory judgment to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of
Oklahoma statutes that limited export or out-of-state water use.152

145. Id. at 698.
146. Id. at 703–04, 708 (concluding that application of “the conservation and
public welfare criteria and the six factors . . . to . . . domestic wells and transfers
of existing rights where the water is to be used outside the State creates an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce” because these restrictions
applied only to “applications to export water from domestic and transfer wells
but not [to] in-state transfers and domestic wells”).
147. Id. at 706–07 (“The only factor that distinguishes the Hueco and Mesilla
Bolsons which would explain their special treatment is that El Paso has filed
applications for export from those aquifers.”).
148. Id. at 700.
149. 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011).
150. Id. at 1227. Multistate compacts are creatures of the Compact Clause of
the United States Constitution and have the effect of federal law. See generally
Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741 (2010).
151. Tarrant, 656 F.3d at 1227.
152. Id.
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Relying on Sporhase, Tarrant claimed that these Oklahoma statutes
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.153
However, both the district court and the Tenth Circuit ruled
that Sporhase was distinguishable and that Dormant Commerce
Clause limitations were inapplicable because the Red River waters
at issue were subject to an interstate compact ratified by
Congress.154 The district court and Tenth Circuit agreed that
because the congressionally ratified Red River Compact divided
the water between states and specifically allocated certain portions
to Oklahoma, then Oklahoma’s restrictions pursuant to that
allocation could not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause.155
Thus, in a decision rendered in September 2011, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that “[t]he broad language of key Compact provisions
inoculates the Oklahoma statutes challenged here from Dormant
Commerce Clause attack” because the compact contained clear
statements authorizing state regulation.156 Tarrant has sought
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court on this issue, and
the petition was still pending at the time of this writing.157
IV. STATE PRACTICE IN LIGHT OF A CORRECT READING OF
SPORHASE
As interstate water markets come online, states need to
carefully consider any restrictions on water export or preferences
for in-state water use. Sporhase and its surrounding cases
(collectively, the “Sporhase Doctrine”) leave states with four
important considerations to assess the compatibility of state water
regulations with the Dormant Commerce Clause. First, both state
characterizations of water resources and state water practice will
determine whether waters are articles of commerce and water
regulations are subject to Dormant Commerce Clause review.
Second, generally applicable water restrictions are more likely to
survive Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Third, states gain
more freedom to regulate when they define and document water
“shortage.”158 Finally, water compacts can remove state water
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1231, 1239.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1237.
157. See Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann Pending Petition,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/tarrant-regional-waterdistrict-v-herrmann/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
158. As discussed later, the authors argue that the term shortage, as used by
the Court, actually stands in for water need, as opposed to drought. See
discussion infra Part IV.C.
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restrictions from Dormant Commerce Clause review.
Understanding the Sporhase Doctrine and properly accounting for
these considerations is essential to states’ abilities to shape their
water futures, particularly when it comes to environmental water
concerns. This Part discusses each consideration in turn and uses
Louisiana as an example of how states might navigate the
Sporhase Doctrine.
A. State Characterization and Treatment of Water Resources
1. Determining Whether Water Is an Article of Commerce
The threshold question for whether state water restrictions are
subject to Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry is whether the
state’s water is an article of commerce.159 If so, then the water falls
under federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction and restrictions must
pass Dormant Commerce Clause muster.160 If not, then state water
restrictions are immune from Dormant Commerce Clause
review.161 Importantly and fortunately, the Sporhase Doctrine
demonstrates that whether water is under federal Commerce
Clause–Dormant Commerce Clause jurisdiction requires no
inquiry into the historically confusing162 and continuingly
contentious163 concept of navigability.164 The question centers
solely on whether water is an article of commerce.165
In turn, whether water is an article of commerce depends on
how states treat water, both in law and in practice. In reviewing
this issue, a court performs a three-step inquiry, with the third step
likely to be most important. First, the court determines whether
159. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 943 (1982);
see also Klein, supra note 62, at 137 (“Instead of considering whether the
challenged Nebraska statute posed an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce, Sporhase first evaluated whether groundwater itself is an article of
commerce.”).
160. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
161. Id.
162. See generally PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012)
(analyzing historic navigability).
163. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (determining
that navigable waters within the purview of the Clean Water Act include waters
that are relatively permanent and not simply intermittent or ephemeral).
164. The concern for navigability involved with Clean Water Act
jurisdictional inquiries stems from the Clean Water Act’s use of the statutory
term “navigable waters.” See id. at 723. Because no such statutory language
governs the question of whether water is an article of commerce, the
navigability issue is inapposite in this instance.
165. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
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states have the power to characterize water such that it does not
enter commerce. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has answered
this question affirmatively and has not revisited it, this step
becomes essentially a background principle.166 Second, the Court
inquires whether the state has exercised this power and declared
water to be outside of commerce. If state law treats water as an
article of commerce, the inquiry is over and the Dormant
Commerce Clause balancing can begin.167 If, however, state law
declares water to be publicly owned or reserved outside of
commerce, the court takes a third step and examines the practice
within the state to see if the de facto treatment of water resembles
commerce. As opposed to the first two inquiries, which tend
toward formalism, this third, functionalist inquiry is fact-intensive
and focuses on state practice rather than on written law. This third
inquiry is also the ultimate determiner of whether water is an
article of commerce. As such, one might approach the third inquiry
as a shorthand, single-step determination of whether water is an
article of commerce, but both a thorough, precise analysis of state
authority and a complete synthesis of the Supreme Court’s
treatment of the issue involve all three steps.
Regarding the first question, the court determines whether the
states have the power to define property rights in natural resources,
particularly water-use rights, in such a way that they do not enter
interstate commerce. The U.S. Supreme Court answered this
question affirmatively in Hudson County and has not since
reexamined this fundamental question.168 In Hudson County, the
Court recognized that states’ police power includes the authority to
designate certain resources, especially water, as public things that
cannot be held as private property and thus cannot be bought and
sold.169 No case since has directly disputed or overruled this
conclusion.170 Rather, in Altus, Texas merely declined to exercise
this power and, instead, legally treated its groundwater as private

166. See Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1908).
167. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
168. Hudson Cnty., 209 U.S. at 356–57.
169. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
170. While Hudson County relied in part on Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), as
precedent for expansive state authority in this area, and while Geer was
subsequently overruled by Hughes, this case dealt with federal regulatory
authority rather than with limiting states’ authority to define property in
resources. Hudson Cnty., 209 U.S. at 356. Additionally, Hughes offers another
example of state practice (the sale of minnows), reflecting that the state did not
actually remove the item from commerce de facto. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 323.

2012]

ESCAPING THE SPORHASE MAZE

201

property,171 and in Sporhase Nebraska’s groundwater was an
article of commerce not because Nebraska lacked the authority to
reserve it outside of commerce, but because Nebraska de facto
treated its groundwater as a marketable item.172 Thus, the Supreme
Court has continually recognized state authority to classify water
as publicly owned and outside of commerce. So, the first question
essentially becomes a background legal principle about the extent
of state power, leaving for the second and third inquiries the
question of whether states have actually, in law and in fact,
exercised this power and treated water as a resource outside of
commerce.
This leads to the second inquiry, where a court examines
whether state law classifies water resources as private property—
and thus articles of commerce—or as public resources outside of
commerce. The Supreme Court in Hudson County went this far,173
concluding that New Jersey’s riparian scheme maintained a public
ownership of surface water and thus legally reserved it outside of
commerce.174 The Altus decision175 also concluded at this second
inquiry because Texas law treated groundwater as private property
in commerce, so no further examination was necessary before
beginning Dormant Commerce Clause review.176 Finally, in
Sporhase the Court examined Nebraska’s legal treatment of its
water, recognizing that Nebraska law and the Nebraska Supreme
Court considered water not to be “a market item freely transferable
for value among private parties, and therefore . . . not an article of
commerce.”177 Thus, the Court in Sporhase moved to the
171. There was no written Supreme Court opinion in Altus, but in Sporhase
the Court briefly discussed the interplay between Altus and Hudson County.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 950. The Court noted that Altus “is inconsistent with
Hudson County” based on the district court’s analysis of the Texas statute at
issue in Altus, which it found unconstitutional because it prevented water that
was personal property, and, thus in commerce, from being transported interstate.
Id. at 950 & n.12.
172. Id. at 951. In fact, Sporhase recognized that state ownership of
resources is not “without significance” and “may not be irrelevant to Commerce
Clause analysis”; it just moved to the second and third inquiries to resolve the
issue. Id. at 951–53.
173. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). In Hudson County, the Court stopped its inquiry at
this step because it had not yet developed the functionalist third inquiry used in
Sporhase.
174. See supra notes 71–84 and accompanying text.
175. Though in Altus the Supreme Court did not necessarily adopt the
reasoning of the lower court, the Court’s subsequent discussion of Altus in
Sporhase shows that it fits within this analysis.
176. See supra notes 86–96 and accompanying text.
177. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944.
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functionalist third inquiry, asking how the state actually treats
water de facto.
In the third inquiry, the court moves from examining
announced legal treatment of water to investigating state practice.
Here, the court determines whether the state actually treats water
as a public good outside of commerce or whether the assertions of
public ownership merely mask commoditized water that is
transferred for value.178 The bulk of the Court’s analysis in
Sporhase centered on this third inquiry,179 and it ultimately found
Nebraska’s claimed public ownership of water to be a “legal
fiction” because it was inconsistent with the water marketing
occurring within Nebraska.180 Looking past legalistic
characterizations, the Court asked simply whether water was
exchanged for value in Nebraska.181 The Court found that it was
because Municipal Utility Districts in Nebraska distributed water
in exchange for payment.182 Thus, the Court concluded that the
exchange of payment for water made it a market commodity and
article of commerce, regardless of the formal characterizations or
rate structures.183
178. This is another example of water rights distinguishing between formal
“paper rights” and functional realities at play.
179. When Hudson County was decided, the Court did not yet use this
functionalist third inquiry. If it had, Hudson might have come out differently if
water was distributed for a price within New Jersey, as was the plan for the
water exported out of New Jersey.
180. Id. at 951–52. Sporhase proves that a court will give a hard look to
whether water is an article of commerce based on state practice, not just state
declaration. As much is clear in the Sporhase opinion where, despite the
Nebraska Supreme Court’s declaration that Nebraska groundwater was not a
market item, id. at 944, the Supreme Court looked beyond that to the Nebraska
practice of allowing the transfer of some groundwater for a fee. See id. at 951
(citing Nebraska’s permitting of arrangements transferring water from rural to
urban areas). This differs greatly from the deference to New Jersey’s practice
found in Hudson County. See, e.g., Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (“The problems of irrigation have no place here. Leaving
them on one side, it appears to us that few public interests are more obvious,
indisputable, and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public
of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially
undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public
welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.”).
181. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951–52.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 951–52 (“The fiction is illustrated by municipal water supply
arrangements pursuant to which ground water is withdrawn from rural areas and
transferred to urban areas. Such arrangements are permitted in Nebraska, but the
Nebraska Supreme Court distinguished them on the ground that the transferor
was only permitted to charge as a price for the water his costs of distribution and
not the value of the water itself. Unless demand is greater than supply, however,
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The state-specific nature of these three inquiries illustrates that
the Sporhase Doctrine contains no categorical conclusion that all
water is necessarily an article of commerce. Rather, all of these
cases look at the particularities of state law and practice to
determine, on a state-by-state basis, whether water is an article of
commerce in a given state.184 Further, while the functionalist third
inquiry may ultimately reveal that water is an article of commerce
in most, if not all, states, due regard for state sovereignty and
police power in defining property requires the entire three-step
inquiry for an informed look at state law and practice. Anything
less than a thorough state-by-state approach would essentially strip
states of their fundamental police-power authority to define (or
redefine) property.185
In this regard, El Paso I and II exhibited a common misreading
of Sporhase and erred in failing to follow the three-step state-bystate inquiry. These cases failed to recognize that state sovereignty
includes the potential authority, whether exercised or not, to
reserve water outside of commerce, failed to analyze whether state
law purported to hold water outside of commerce, and failed to
inquire whether New Mexico actually treated water as a
commodity. Instead, El Paso I and II applied Sporhase’s “legal
fiction” analysis as absolute and, in doing so, fostered

this reasoning does not distinguish minnows, the price of which presumably is
derived from the costs of seining and of transporting the catch to market. Even
in cases of shortage, in which the seller of the natural resource can demand a
price that exceeds his costs, the State’s rate structure that requires the price to be
cost-justified is economically comparable to price regulation. A State’s power to
regulate prices or rates has never been thought to depend on public ownership of
the controlled commodity. It would be anomalous if federal power to regulate
economic transactions in natural resources depended on the characterization of
the payment as compensation for distribution services, on the one hand, or as the
price of goods, on the other.” (citations omitted)).
184. The Sporhase opinion emphasizes the state-by-state nature of this
inquiry, noting that “[i]f Congress chooses to legislate [to regulate groundwater]
under its commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska
than in Texas and States with similar property laws.” Id. at 953. The Court did
not say that Congress will have equal Commerce Clause power to regulate water
in all states; rather, the Court focused on states with property regimes that
commoditize water: Nebraska, Texas, and “[s]tates with similar property laws.”
Id. Thus, the Court emphasized that the proper inquiry for whether water is an
article of commerce will turn on examination of the particular property law of
each state.
185. For example, if a state declared water to be publicly owned and had no
municipal utility arrangements transferring water for value, or if it eliminated
such arrangements, its water could be considered outside of commerce.
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misunderstanding and confusion about the proper application of
Sporhase, as well as the extent of state police power.186
While the Sporhase Doctrine is not categorical and involves
state-by-state inquiries, most states have municipal utilities that
distribute water for a fee,187 so they will likely find that their
waters are articles of commerce. Thus, in designing or amending
water restrictions, states with these utilities arrangements should
assume that they will be subject to Dormant Commerce Clause
review. As discussed above, if water is exchanged for value, it will
be an article of commerce.188 However, this functional inquiry
draws no apparent distinction between groundwater versus surface
water. So, even though Sporhase addressed only groundwater and
most state laws distinguish between ground and surface water,189
attempts to distinguish Sporhase on this basis are likely to fail in
the presence of a fee-based water utility. Similarly, while it may be
tempting for eastern states to argue that Sporhase is the rule for
prior appropriation jurisdictions whereas Hudson County governs
riparian schemes, that distinction also fades in light of the
importance that Sporhase placed on water utilities.190
In Louisiana, for example, water is an article of commerce
under the functionalist third inquiry even though that state follows
a riparian approach,191 distinguishes between surface and
groundwater, and has a strong legal tradition characterizing water
186. In the end, the El Paso cases may have reached the correct conclusion
about New Mexico water being an article of commerce because water is
municipally supplied in that state. However, this does not ameliorate application
of the incorrect test and reasoning.
187. See generally Scott E. Masten, Public Utility Ownership in 19thCentury America: The “Aberrant” Case of Water, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 604
(2011).
188. See supra notes 181–183 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Sharon Megdal et al., The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water
Law and the Environment, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 243, 276 (2011)
(“Arizona law regulates groundwater and surface water differently.”); Travis
Witherspoon, Into the Well: Desired Future Conditions and the Emergence of
Groundwater as the New Senior Water Right, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J.
166, 169 (2010) (explaining that in Texas, “[g]roundwater is not state owned
and controlled like surface water” and describing the laws governing each); see
also Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust: Application of the Public Trust
Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 204 (2008)
(“Though groundwater aquifers know no political bounds and are often
interconnected to surface waters, groundwater law traditionally was adopted on
a state-by-state basis separate from laws governing surface water.”).
190. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951–52 (1982).
191. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 657 (2008) (“The owner of an estate bordering
on running water may use it as it runs for the purpose of watering his estate or
for other purposes.”).
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as publicly owned. Working through the three-pronged Sporhase
inquiry, first, Louisiana, like all states, has the police power
authority to define property as falling outside of commerce.
Second, Louisiana law appears to exercise this authority, at least
when it comes to surface water. The Louisiana Constitution
recognizes public responsibilities in water192 and prevents
alienation of state-owned, water-related resources.193 Additionally,
Louisiana law declares surface waters to be public things,194 even
limiting riparian uses of surface water,195 though it has recently
loosened these limitations.196 However, with respect to the third
factor, Louisiana treats groundwater as private property,197 so a
court is likely to find that Louisiana has not legally withdrawn
groundwater from commerce. Regardless, because Louisiana
municipal utilities distribute both surface water198 and
groundwater199 for a fee, the public ownership characterization,
even for surface water, is a legal fiction in this case. Thus,
192. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including
air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall
enact laws to implement this policy.”). The Louisiana Supreme Court has read
article IX, section 1 to impose a “public trust” duty of environmental protection on
all state agencies and officials. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control
Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (La. 1984).
193. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14 (prohibiting donations of state property);
Id. art. IX, § 3 (prohibiting alienation of the beds of navigable waters except for
reclamation of eroded lands).
194. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2010) (declaring such things as
running waters, waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the
territorial sea, and the seashore to be public things); see also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:1101 (2008) (declaring the water and beds of bayous, rivers, lakes,
streams, lagoons, lakes, and bays not privately owned on August 12, 1910, to be
owned by the State).
195. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 657, 658 (2008).
196. See Act of May 25, 2012, No. 261, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 261 (H.B.
532) (West) (allowing the State of Louisiana to enter into cooperative endeavor
agreements for use of running surface waters for nonriparian and consumptive
use).
197. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2010); see also Adams v. Grigsby,
152 So. 2d 619, 622 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (treating groundwater as a fugitive
resource subject to the laws of capture and placing restrictions on location or
purpose of use).
198. See The Water Purification Process at the Carrollton Plant, SEWERAGE
& WATER BD. OF NEW ORLEANS, http://www.swbno.org/history_water_
purification.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (describing the Mississippi River as
the water source for New Orleans, Louisiana utilities).
199. See City of Ruston: Water Utilities, RUSTON.ORG, http://www.ruston.
org/waterfaq/#q3783 (last visited Aug. 9, 2012) (describing the Sparta Aquifer
as the source of municipal water for the city of Ruston, Louisiana).
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Louisiana water is an article of commerce under the third inquiry
because, functionally, Louisiana has water provision arrangements
similar to those at issue in Sporhase.
As the Louisiana example demonstrates, while states retain the
power to characterize water resources and public ownership of
water is not necessarily always a legal fiction, the functionalist
third inquiry in the Sporhase test means that the water in most
states, including most riparian jurisdictions, will be considered an
article of commerce. Thus, states should shape water restrictions
with a mind toward Dormant Commerce Clause review.
2. The Importance of State Characterization in Dormant
Commerce Clause Balancing
While, as a practical matter, most states’ water will be an
article of commerce, state characterization of water resources is far
from irrelevant. Even when a state’s asserted ownership of its
water resources is a legal fiction insufficient to avoid Dormant
Commerce Clause review, it can still impact the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis and trigger greater deference from
courts. As the Court observed in Sporhase, “Nor is appellee’s
claim to public ownership without significance. Like Congress’
deference to state water law, these factors inform the determination
whether the burdens on commerce imposed by state ground water
regulation are reasonable or unreasonable.”200 Even when water is
an article of commerce, the state’s treatment and characterization
of its water resources remain relevant. Thus, returning again to the
example of Louisiana, while the strong declarations of public
ownership201 of water will not immunize Louisiana water
restrictions from Dormant Commerce Clause review, they will
likely give Louisiana more latitude in shaping water regulations
because they make such regulations more likely to be reasonable.
B. Generally Applicable Water Restrictions
The second major consideration under Sporhase is whether a
water restriction is generally applicable because the scope of a
water restriction greatly impacts its likelihood of surviving a
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. As noted, courts evaluate
“evenhanded” restrictions with the Pike test, balancing the burden
imposed on commerce against the benefits to the regulating
200. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
201. See supra notes 192–196 and accompanying text.
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state.202 In the water context, this amounts to a review for
reasonableness, with the Court offering deference to states’
expertise in managing water resources.203 Alternatively,
restrictions that are not considered evenhanded face a low
likelihood of surviving a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
Such restrictions, dubbed “explicit barrier[s] to commerce,”
receive strict scrutiny analysis, requiring that the restriction be
narrowly tailored to the state’s legitimate interest.204 While not
impossible to survive,205 this standard of review usually leads to
invalidation of a restriction.
Because the evenhanded versus explicit-barrier-to-commerce
distinction is so crucial to determining the constitutionality of a
regulation, the differences between the two are critical, though not
necessarily intuitive. For example, to qualify as an evenhanded
regulation, a water restriction need not actually treat interstate and
intrastate transfers of water the same way. Rather, an evenhanded
regulation can burden interstate transfers differently than intrastate
transfers so long as the regulation also restricts intrastate
transfers. Thus, the requirement for evenhandedness is not one of
uniformity; rather, it is one of comparability. For example, in
Sporhase the Court found Nebraska’s requirements “that the
withdrawal of the ground water requested is reasonable, is not
contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare” to be an evenhanded
and ultimately constitutional restriction because Nebraska also
imposed restrictions on intrastate transfers.206 The fact that the
interstate restrictions were not the same as those on intrastate
transfers did not concern the Court. In fact, the Court offered no
discussion of the relative stringency or restrictiveness of the
intrastate versus interstate restrictions. Rather, in determining that
the restrictions were evenhanded, the Court focused on the fact that
there were corollary, though not identical, intrastate regulations.207
The Court went so far as to say that a regulation could apply
only to out-of-state transfers and still qualify as evenhanded and

202. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
203. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954–57.
204. See id. at 957–58.
205. For an example of surviving strict scrutiny in the Dormant Commerce
Clause context, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a Maine
statute banning import of live baitfish after subjecting the statute to strict
scrutiny because Maine documented that there was no less discriminatory means
of avoiding the import of parasites harmful to wild fish).
206. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955–56.
207. Id.
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constitutional, again showing that evenhanded does not mean
uniform. For example, in Sporhase the Court noted that
[a]lthough Commerce Clause concerns are implicated by
the fact that [Nebraska’s water restriction] applies to
interstate transfers but not to intrastate transfers, there are
legitimate reasons for the special treatment accorded
requests to transport ground water across state lines.
Obviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use
restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against
interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the
uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State.208
Thus, the mere existence of other, separate intrastate restrictions
satisfied the Court that the interstate restrictions were evenhanded.
Essentially, this means that courts will require states to have their
own resource restrictions in order before imposing restrictions on
other states. Put another way, a state’s entire water restriction or
conservation program cannot focus solely on restricting interstate
use or transport; it must restrict its own citizens as well, at least to
some degree.
As for “explicit barriers” to interstate commerce, the Court did
not offer a list or test to identify this suspect category of
restrictions. However, the Court indicated that the following will
constitute explicit barriers: a complete ban on export of water, a
condition making export of water practically impossible,209 a
restriction without an intrastate corollary, a regulation with
discriminatory effect and purpose, and a regulation effecting pure
economic protectionism.210
Because evenhanded restrictions have a much greater
likelihood of surviving a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
states should strive to ensure that their restrictions are evenhanded.
The easiest way to achieve evenhandedness is by ensuring that any
interstate restrictions have intrastate corollaries, even if they are
not completely uniform. Though the Court has indicated that
regulations can be evenhanded even when intrastate restrictions do
208. Id.
209. This was the situation in Sporhase. The Nebraska law contained a
reciprocity requirement that allowed export of water to only those states that
would also export water to Nebraska. Id. at 957–58. This requirement made it
impossible to export water from Nebraska to Colorado because Colorado banned
all export of water. Id. Ironically, then, it was Colorado’s hardline restriction
that led to the invalidation of Nebraska’s lesser restriction as an explicit barrier
to commerce.
210. Id. at 956–58.
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not exactly match interstate restrictions,211 there is little precedent
to guide how disparate the treatment can be while still remaining
evenhanded. The closer the match between interstate and intrastate
restrictions, the more likely a restriction will be evenhanded, so
states should err on the side of treating interstate and intrastate uses
equally.
Fortunately for many states, water restrictions that are rooted in
traditional water regimes (such as riparianism) or tied to factors
other than state lines are evenhanded because they apply also to
intrastate use. So, for example, traditional riparian principles that
restrict the use of water to riparian tracts or to a reasonable
distance from a stream are evenhanded because they affect both instate and out-of-state use equally. Similarly, prior appropriation
doctrines like the “no harm” doctrine, which disallows water
transfers that injure junior appropriators,212 are evenhanded, as are
watershed-based or basin-based transfer restrictions and in-stream
flow requirements for ecology or navigation. All of these
restrictions apply to both intrastate and interstate uses and can
supply a starting point for states seeking to restrict water use.
Returning to the example of Louisiana, the state’s traditional
riparian restrictions requiring that surface water be used on a
riparian estate and be returned to its original channel213 are
certainly evenhanded restrictions. However, the state’s recent law
relaxing these restrictions and allowing the state to enter into
cooperative endeavor agreements for consumptive use of surface
water or use on nonriparian tracts214 withdraws the evenhanded
place-based limitations on surface water use. If Louisiana were to
try to introduce additional limitations on the use of surface water, it
must be careful not to restrict out-of-state users without imposing
some in-state restrictions. Similarly, Louisiana’s groundwater use
is not currently restricted in terms of place or purpose of use,215 so
211. Id. at 955–56 (explaining that “a State that imposes severe withdrawal
and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate
commerce” and applying this principle because the first three standards at issue
“may” have been less strict in application than the limitations placed on
intrastate transfers).
212. See Johanna Hamburger, Improving Efficiency and Overcoming
Obstacles to Water Transfers in Utah, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 69, 78
(2011) (explaining that the no harm rule, “a doctrine that all Western states
follow,” disallows a change of use of water from impairing vested rights).
213. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 657, 658 (2008).
214. See Act of May 25, 2012, No. 261, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 261 (H.B.
532) (West).
215. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2010); see also Adams v. Grigsby,
152 So. 2d 619, 623−24 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
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any restriction placed on out-of-state groundwater use would likely
be an explicit barrier to commerce without an in-state corollary.
C. Documentation of Water Shortages
Another major consideration arising from Sporhase is the
importance of state documentation of water “shortages” to justify
water restrictions. A documented record of water shortage makes a
state’s water restrictions more likely to survive a Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge because such a record builds the case
that water restrictions are valid health and safety regulations, as
opposed to impermissible economic protectionism. This Section
discusses the evolution of this documentation requirement and
considers what evidence of “shortage” will help in surviving
Dormant Commerce Clause review of water restrictions,
particularly for wetter eastern states.
Just as Sporhase expanded the Hudson County inquiry into
whether water was an article of commerce by investigating how
states actually treat water in addition to how they legally classify
it,216 Sporhase also deepened the Hudson inquiry into the purpose
of state water restrictions, examining documentation of shortage to
justify state regulations. In Hudson County, the Court explicitly
declined to inquire into evidence of shortage as a basis for state
water restrictions; rather, the Court held that New Jersey’s police
power provided sufficient authority for its water restrictions and
that a state need not offer explanation for its resource management
decisions.217 However, in Sporhase, the Court showed no such
deference to unexplained state management decisions218 and
instead required states to articulate reasoning to justify their water

216. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
217. See Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1908).
In fact, the Court emphatically stated that the states need offer no justification.
Id. (“We are of opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the state to
insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not
dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as
to future needs. . . . [A state] finds itself in possession of what all admit to be a
great public good, and what it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its
will.” (emphasis added)).
218. It is possible that the different inquiries in the two cases explain the
difference. In Hudson, the Court found that the Dormant Commerce Clause
inquiry was inapplicable because the water was not an article of commerce. Id.
In Sporhase, however, the water was an article of commerce, and the Court
required documentation so that it could evaluate the Dormant Commerce Clause
issue. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54 (1982).
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restrictions,219 stressing the importance of documenting shortage
and of closely examining the evidence proffered to justify
Nebraska’s restrictions.220
For example, in upholding Nebraska’s evenhanded restrictions,
the Court in Sporhase emphasized the evidence of shortage
necessitating those restrictions. The Court noted its reluctance “to
condemn as unreasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve
and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource in times of
severe shortage.”221 The Court also identified as evidence of
shortage Nebraska’s designation of groundwater control areas, its
declarations of water shortage, and its restrictions and monitoring
of in-state water use and transfers.222 In light of this documented
need, the Court had little trouble finding Nebraska’s evenhanded
restrictions reasonable.223
Conversely, in holding that Nebraska’s reciprocity requirement
was not narrowly tailored, the Court emphasized a lack of
documentation to justify that measure. Specifically, the Court
highlighted a lack of evidence that
the State as a whole suffers a water shortage, . . . the
intrastate transportation of water from areas of abundance
to areas of shortage is feasible regardless of distance, . . .
219. Id. at 954–55. This shift in the Court’s expectation of documentation is
not unique to reviewing state actions, though. Rather, it fits with the Court’s
requirements of Congress in exercise of its Commerce Clause power. For
example, the record-keeping requirement in Sporhase provides a corollary to the
requirements the Court placed on Congress in Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001),
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000). Those cases collectively stand for the proposition that when
Congress wishes to push the limits of its Commerce Clause authority and
regulate in areas that may infringe on state police power, Congress must make a
clear statement of its intention to do so and must create a record documenting
the links to interstate commerce that justify the federal authority to act in the
area. The documentation requirement in Sporhase is the converse of the same
concept. See generally Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2003) (charting the history of the
Commerce Clause and discussing Lopez, Morrison, and Solid Waste Agency in
detail). Under Sporhase, when states wish to push the limits of their police
power and regulate in areas that may infringe on Congress’s authority to
regulate interstate commerce, then states must clearly document the justification
for doing so. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954–55. According to the Court, when state
or federal entities wish to push the limits of their regulatory authority, they must
explain their basis for doing so.
220. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957–58.
221. Id. at 956 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 955.
223. Id. at 955−56.
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[or] the importation of water from adjoining States would
roughly compensate for any exportation to those States.224
With a record to justify the reciprocity requirement, the Court
held that the restriction was not narrowly tailored.225 However, the
Court indicated that had there been proper documentation, even
Nebraska’s explicit barrier to commerce might have survived strict
scrutiny because a “demonstrably arid” state may be able to
marshal evidence that a total ban on exports is narrowly tailored.226
The Court’s emphasis on “severe shortage” and “demonstrably
arid” states raises the question of what constitutes sufficient
shortage or aridity to influence the Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. While there is little precedent, Sporhase and its
subsequent interpretations in El Paso I and II indicate that
economic concerns will be insufficient to demonstrate meaningful
shortage.227 Rather, relevant shortage must trigger health, safety,
environmental, recreational, or aesthetic concerns.228 Further,
while states need not wait for imminent threats to human survival
before restricting water use, the more concretely a state can link
restrictions to human necessity, the more likely it is to survive
Dormant Commerce Clause review. For example, the Court in
Sporhase held that a state legitimately restricts water when
“protecting the health of its citizens—and not simply the health of
its economy.”229 El Paso I took this concept to its extreme,
allowing that “a state may discriminate in favor of its citizens only
to the extent that water is essential to human survival.”230
However, the El Paso II court subsequently recognized that as long
as economic concerns were not the primary motivating factor, a
state could invoke a limited preference for public welfare concerns
affecting health, safety, recreational, aesthetic, and environmental
interests.231
Moreover, states should also expect probing, substantive
review of justifications given for water restrictions. Courts require
more than a procedural cataloging of reasons; they closely examine
the rationale for restrictions.232 For example, in El Paso II the court
closely examined the justifications for a moratorium on
224. Id. at 958.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 123–148 and accompanying text.
228. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984).
229. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
230. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. 379, 389 (D.N.M. 1983) (emphasis added).
231. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. at 700.
232. Id. at 705 (“It is the duty of the court to look behind the legislative
recitals of purpose to discover the true purpose of a challenged statute.”).
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appropriations from two basins, ultimately finding them illusory
and striking down the moratorium.233 In one instance of this close
review, the court dismissed the asserted deficiency of hydrological
information about the basins because the same was true of other
basins not subject to moratoria and because a proposed study of the
basins would not be complete until after the moratorium expired.234
This hard look at the underlying documentation and reasoning for
the moratorium shows that a court will probe into the substance of
documentation, even for evenhanded regulations.
Beyond the basic principles that purely economic concerns will
not constitute acceptable shortage and that the court will take a
hard look at evidence of shortage, questions still abound as to the
circumstances that will demonstrate sufficient shortage to impact
Dormant Commerce Clause balancing. For example, what must the
timescale be for the shortage, and how bad must things get before
restrictions are justified? Additionally, relatively water-rich states
may wonder against which baseline courts will measure shortage;
will a wet state ever be able to demonstrate shortage sufficient to
satisfy the court?
El Paso II noted these important questions but offered little
concrete guidance beyond indicating that the inquiry will require
balancing of specific circumstances. The court indicated that a
state must offer a sense of the time, place, certainty, and severity of
projected shortages, but it need not await disaster or drought before
restricting water use.235 In the end, this will involve a balancing
233. Id. at 705–07.
234. Id. at 705–06.
235. Id. at 701. The court observed that
[a] state may favor its own citizens in times and places of shortage. Of
course, this does not mean that a state may limit or bar exports simply
because it anticipates that one day there will not be enough water to
meet all future uses. Even some of the most water-abundant states
predict shortages at some future date. The preference envisioned by the
Supreme Court must be limited to the times and places where its
exercise would not place unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce
relative to the local benefits it produces.
On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to require a state to wait
until it is in the midst of a dire shortage before it can prefer its own
citizens’ use of the available water over out-of-state usage. A limited
preference which could not be exercised until water resources were
almost depleted would be no preference at all. If the limited preference
is to be meaningful the states must be permitted to prefer local usage
while there is still water to conserve. The proximity in time of a
projected shortage, the certainty that it will occur, its predicted severity,
and whether alternative measures could prevent or alleviate the
shortage are all factors which must be weighed when balancing the
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inquiry, but the more information that a state can marshal to justify
its position and show the need for water restrictions, the more
likely the restrictions are to survive Dormant Commerce Clause
review.
As for “wet” states documenting shortage, they cannot be
categorically excluded from enacting water restrictions simply
because of their relative abundance of water. With water demand
growing and climate change threatening to decrease supplies
throughout the country, shortage is not just an issue in the drier
West. Further, “wet” states have environmental and ecological
water demands based on relative abundance of water. Thus, while
a drought year in Louisiana might still see more water than a wet
year in Arizona,236 this does not diminish the problems
(environmental and otherwise) that shortage poses in the wetter
state. The court’s inquiry into shortage must proceed state-by-state
and consider the broader context in evaluating water restrictions. In
these instances, “shortage” or “arid[ity]” must function more as a
term of art, synonymous with “demonstrated water need.” The
cases show that it is the responsibility of the individual states to
document these water shortages and to educate the court on these
water needs, and this is particularly important in wetter states
where needs may not be as obvious. Additionally, because of
historically and relatively more abundant water supplies, wetter
states may face greater challenges in demonstrating that their
restrictions are not protectionist, so documentation of shortage
must focus particularly on health and safety concerns.
States may draw upon a number of sources to demonstrate such
shortage. Documentation of a drought or historical scarcity is the

local interests served by the exercise of a preference against the
burdens it places on interstate commerce.
New Mexico need not wait until the appropriate time and place of
shortage arises to enact a statute limiting exports. The State may enact a
law to provide for future contingencies. If facially valid, any
constitutional attack on such a statute for violation of the Commerce
Clause must await its application.

Id.
236. The year 1988 is often used as benchmark year for low flows on the
Mississippi River, a year in which flows at Vicksburg, Mississippi were 439,000
cubic feet per second, which compares to the record-high flows on the Colorado
of 35,222 cubic feet per second (25.5 million acre feet per year). See U.S. DEP’T
OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INTERIM REPORT NO. 1: COLORADO
RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY (STATUS REPORT) 18 (2011);
Edwin P. Maurer & Dennis P. Lettenmaier, Calculation of Undepleted Runoff
for the GCIP Region, 1988–2000, UNIV. OF WASH. (Oct. 2001),
http://www.ce.washington.edu/~edm/WEBS_runoff/.
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obvious approach. Documentation of increased consumption levels
or projections of water supply may also suffice when tied to human
health rather than economic uses. Even preexisting regulation of
intrastate water resources helps demonstrate scarcity, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Sporhase.237 Beyond these sources,
states may also attempt to rely on projections of climate change
destabilizing water supplies, documented environmental water
needs such as ecosystem demands on freshwater, and even
hydrological or geophysical characteristics of particular water
sources such as recharge rates for particular aquifers. The ultimate
guiding principle is that a record of shortage must be focused on
health and safety rather than economic concerns and must be
sufficiently concrete.
Louisiana can again serve as the example for approaches and
challenges that wetter eastern states face in documenting shortage.
To its benefit, Louisiana has, to some extent, documented its
coastal freshwater needs. For example, the 2012 Louisiana Coastal
Master Plan demonstrates the need for ample freshwater flows to
nourish and sustain Louisiana’s coastal environment.238 This is a
start, and to build on it, Louisiana might attempt to quantify coastal
freshwater needs along with the water needs of upland wetlands. In
most other regards, however, Louisiana has not sufficiently
documented water needs to positively influence a Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. In the case of groundwater, Louisiana
has neither inventoried its supply nor imposed any restriction on
groundwater use. For surface water, Louisiana fares little better.
Again, Louisiana has no comprehensive surface water inventory,
budget, or management plan. Although Louisiana’s riparian system
imposes some limitations on water use and requires return flows
back into the watercourse, Louisiana has statutorily relaxed them
in order to facilitate development. Essentially, Louisiana currently
treats its water as if there is no shortage or need to conserve, and
this free-spending attitude toward in-state water use will severely
disadvantage any attempt to restrict out-of-state use. In requiring
that states document water shortages to justify restrictions, the
Supreme Court requires states to have their in-state management in
order before burdening other states. States must form a record to

237. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 941, 957
(1982) (holding that state conservation efforts are not without import because
they show that “the natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly
produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of
shortage”).
238. See 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 9.
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educate courts on particular water needs that justify regulations, as
well as on state efforts to share the burden of water restriction.
D. Water Compact Language
Though Sporhase represents the heart of the Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause inquiry for water restrictions, also important is
when Sporhase does not apply. This is the case when waters are
subject to an interstate compact.239 Water compacts can insulate
restrictions from Dormant Commerce Clause challenges because
Congress must approve a compact.240 Thus, water restrictions
pursuant to compacts effectively bear Congress’s blessing and
therefore cannot interfere with federal regulation of interstate
commerce. When a water restriction involves compact waters, the
initial inquiry turns to whether the compact authorizes the
restriction through clear delegation of authority to the states. If
there has been such delegation, then the restriction is immune from
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge; if not, then the restriction
receives Dormant Commerce Clause review under Sporhase. Thus,
prior to conducting its Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, El
Paso I extensively analyzed a potentially relevant water compact
to ensure that it did not remove the issue from Dormant Commerce
Clause concern.241
Because so much turns on whether the compact clearly
delegates to states the authority to regulate waters as commerce,
the particulars of compact language take on vital importance.
Courts have found such delegation when compact language divides
water between states. In such instances, Congress has essentially
allocated water to the states, and states can restrict that water
without worrying about interfering with interstate commerce.
In Tarrant, for example, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
Red River Compact contained a sufficiently clear congressional
grant of authority to allow Oklahoma to regulate certain Red River

239. The Interstate Compact Clause of the United States Constitution provides,
in relevant part, that no state may, “without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
240. See Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX.
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 90 (2011) (“Since the federal government can
discriminate against particular states through federal legislation, an interstate
compact as federal law is immunized against dormant Commerce Clause
violations.”).
241. See El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. 379, 383–88 (D.N.M. 1983).
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water without regard to the Dormant Commerce Clause.242
Particularly, the court focused on the compact provisions that
allowed states to “freely administer” water apportioned to them “in
any manner” that seemed beneficial.243 The court also noted that
the compact explicitly stated that it was not meant to “interfere”
with state “appropriation, use, and control of water” and that the
state retained “unrestricted use” of waters in basins covered by the
compact.244 The Tenth Circuit concluded that “[t]aken together, the
Compact provisions using words and phrases such as ‘unrestricted
use,’ ‘control,’ ‘in any manner,’ ‘freely administer,’ and ‘nothing
shall be deemed to interfere’ give the Oklahoma Legislature wide
latitude to regulate interstate commerce in its state’s apportioned
water.”245 As a result, the court decided that Oklahoma’s
restrictions were immune from the Sporhase Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.246
Thus, states can find more flexibility by shaping water
restrictions pursuant to compact terms because such restrictions
would be immune to Dormant Commerce Clause review. So, for
example, since Louisiana is a party to the Red River Compact,247 it
could restrict water subject to that compact without worry of
Dormant Commerce Clause invalidation, even if the restrictions
were not evenhanded or were lacking justification in water
shortage.
V. CONCLUSION
Water may be an article of commerce, but it is also a resource
that must, at least to some extent, remain in its natural place.
Otherwise, environments, ecosystems, and even entire coastal
landmasses unravel. Thus, there is a vital state interest in keeping
water where it naturally occurs. The Dormant Commerce Clause
does not run counter to such critical health and safety interests; it
merely seeks to ferret out economic protectionism. Therefore, the
Sporhase Doctrine does and must allow states to regulate water in
favor of keeping it in its natural place, even if this means keeping
wet states wet. To conclude otherwise would turn Sporhase on its
head by allowing the economic wants of dry, importing states to
trump the environmental needs for water in wetter origin states. It
242. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th
Cir. 2011).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1237−38.
245. Id. at 1239.
246. Id.
247. See Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980).
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would allow importing states to practice just the sort of economic
protectionism that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits.
A correct reading of Sporhase shows that it does not create a
great shift in control of water resources. The states, through law
and practice, still determine whether water is an article in
commerce. When water restrictions are subject to Dormant
Commerce Clause review, they are likely to survive if evenhanded
and justified by documentation of shortage. Thus, states retain
substantial control over their water resources and, following the
proper guidance from Sporhase, may act to protect them without
running afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Not only does Sporhase preserve states’ abilities to maintain
water in place, but it also encourages better water practices within
states by decoupling federal jurisdiction over water from the
clumsy question of navigability, by discarding the prevalent but
hydrologically dubious tendency to treat groundwater and surface
water as distinct resources, and by forcing states to better study,
document, and manage their water supplies.

